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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of detecting the in-
formation source in a network in which the spread of information
follows the popular Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model.
We assume all nodes in the network are in the susceptible state
initially except the information source which is in the infected
state. Susceptible nodes may then be infected by infected nodes,
and infected nodes may recover and will not be infected again
after recovery. Given a snapshot of the network, from which we
know all infected nodes but cannot distinguish susceptible nodes
and recovered nodes, the problem is to find the information
source based on the snapshot and the network topology. We
develop a sample path based approach where the estimator of the
information source is chosen to be the root node associated with
the sample path that most likely leads to the observed snapshot.
We prove for infinite-trees, the estimator is a node that minimizes
the maximum distance to the infected nodes. A reverse-infection
algorithm is proposed to find such an estimator in general graphs.
We prove that for g-regular trees such that gq > 1, where g is
the node degree and q is the infection probability, the estimator
is within a constant distance from the actual source with a high
probability, independent of the number of infected nodes and the
time the snapshot is taken. Our simulation results show that for
tree networks, the estimator produced by the reverse-infection
algorithm is closer to the actual source than the one identified by
the closeness centrality heuristic. We then further evaluate the
performance of the reverse infection algorithm on several real
world networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Diffusion processes in networks refer to the spread of
information throughout the networks, and have been widely
used to model many real-world phenomena such as the
outbreak of epidemics, the spreading of gossips over online
social networks, the spreading of computer virus over the
Internet, and the adoption of innovations. Important properties
of diffusion processes such as the outbreak thresholds [1] and
the impact of network topologies [2] have been intensively
studied.
In this paper, we are interested in the reverse of the diffusion
problem: given a snapshot of the diffusion process at time
t, can we tell which node is the source of the diffusion?
The answer to this problem has many important applications,
and can help us answer the following questions: who is the
rumor source in online social networks? which computer is the
first one infected by a computer virus? who is the one who
uploaded contraband materials to the Internet? and where is
the source of an epidemic?
We call this problem information source detection problem.
This information source detection problem has been studied
in [3]–[5] under the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model, in which
susceptible nodes may be infected but infected nodes cannot
recover. The authors formulated the problem as a maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) problem, and developed novel
algorithms to detect the source.
In this paper, we adopt the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
(SIR) model, a standard model of epidemics [6], [7]. The
network is assumed to be an undirected graph and each node in
the network has three possible states: susceptible (S), infected
(I), and recovered (R). Nodes in state S can be infected
and change to state I , and nodes in state I can recover and
change to state R. Recovered nodes cannot be infected again.
We assume that initially all nodes are in the susceptible state
except one infected node (called the information source). The
information source then infects its neighbors, and the infor-
mation starts to spread in the network. Now given a snapshot
of the network, in which we can identify infected nodes
and healthy (susceptible and recovered) nodes (we assume
susceptible nodes and recovered nodes are indistinguishable),
the question is which node is the information source.
We remark that it is very important to take recovery into
consideration since recovery can happen due to various reasons
in practice. For example, a contraband material uploader may
delete the file, a computer may recover from a virus attack after
anti-virus software removes the virus, and a user may delete
the rumor from her/his blog. In order to solve the information
source detection problem in these scenarios, we study the SIR
model in this paper, which makes the problem significantly
more challenging than that in the SI model as we will explain
in the related work section.
A. Main Results
The main results of this paper are summarized below.
• Similar to the SI model, the information source detection
problem can be formalized as an MLE problem. Unfor-
tunately, to solve the MLE problem, we need to consider
all possible infection sample paths, and for each sample
path, we need to specify the infection time and recovery
time for each healthy node and the infection time for each
infected node, so the number of possible sample paths
is at the order of Ω(tN ), where N is the network size
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and t is the time the snapshot is obtained. Therefore, the
MLE problem is difficult to solve even when t is known.
The problem becomes much harder when t is unknown,
which is the assumption of this paper. To overcome this
difficulty, we propose a sample path based approach. We
propose to find the sample path which most likely leads
to the observed snapshot and view the source associated
with that sample path as the information source. We
call this problem optimal sample path detection problem.
We investigate the structure properties of the optimal
sample path in trees. Defining the infection eccentricity
of a node to be the maximum distance from the node
to infected nodes, we prove that the source node of
the optimal sample path is the node with the minimum
infection eccentricity. Since a node with the minimum
eccentricity in a graph is called the Jordan center, we
call the nodes with the minimum infection eccentricity
the Jordan infection centers. Therefore, the sample path
based estimator is one of the Jordan infection centers.
• We propose a low complexity algorithm, called reverse
infection algorithm, to find the sample path based esti-
mator in general graphs. In the algorithm, each infected
node broadcasts its identity in the network, the node who
first collect all identities of infected nodes declares itself
as the information source, breaking ties based on the sum
of distances to infected nodes. The running time of this
algorithm is equal to the minimum infection eccentricity,
and the number of messages each node receives/sends at
each iteration is bounded by the degree of the node.
• We analyze the performance of the reverse infection
algorithm on g-regular trees, and show that the algorithm
can output a node within a constant distance from the
actual source with a high probability, independent of the
number of infected nodes and the time the snapshot is
taken.
• We conduct extensive simulations over various networks
to verify the performance of the reverse infection algo-
rithm. The detection rate over regular trees is found to
be around 60%, and is higher than that of the infection
closeness centrality (or called distance centrality) heuris-
tic. The infection closeness of a node is defined to be
the inverse of the sum of distances to infected nodes and
the infection closeness centrality heuristic is to claim the
node with the maximum infection closeness as the source.
Note that in [3]–[5], the authors proved the node with
the maximum infection closeness is the MLE on regular
trees. For real world networks, our experiments also
show that the reverse infection algorithm outperforms
random guesses significantly. We then further evaluate the
performance of the reverse infection algorithm on several
real world networks.
B. Related Work
There have been extensive studies on the spread of epi-
demics in networks based on the SIR model (see [1], [2],
[8], [9] and references within). The work most related to this
paper is [3]–[5], in which the information source detection
problem was studied under the SI model. [10], [11] con-
siders the problem of detecting multiple information sources
under the SI model. This paper considers the SIR model,
where infection nodes may recover, which can occur in many
practical scenarios as we have explained. Because of node
recovery, the information source detection problem under the
SIR model differs significantly from that under the SI model.
The differences are summarized below.
• The set of possible sources in the SI model [3]–[5]
is restricted to the set of infected nodes. In the SIR
model, all nodes are possible information sources because
we assume susceptible nodes and recovered nodes are
indistinguishable and a healthy node may be a recovered
node so can be the information source. Therefore, the
number of candidate sources is much larger in the SIR
model than that in the SI model.
• A key observation in [3]–[5] is that on regular trees,
all permitted permutations of infection sequences (a in-
fection sequence specifies the order at which nodes are
infected) are equally likely under the SI model. The
number of possible permutations from a fixed root node,
therefore, decides the likelihood of the root node being
the source. However, under the SIR model, different
infection sequences are associated with different prob-
abilities, so counting the number of permutations are not
sufficient.
• [3]–[5] proved that the node with the maximum closeness
centrality is the an MLE on regular-trees. We define the
infection closeness centrality to be the inverse of the
sum of distances to infected nodes. Our simulations show
that the sample path based estimator is closer to the
actual source than the nodes with the maximum infection
closeness.
Other related works include: (1) detecting the first adopter of
innovations based on a game theoretical model [12] in which
the authors derived the MLE but the computational complexity
is exponential in the number of nodes, (2) network forensics
under the SI model [13], where the goal is to distinguish an
epidemic infection from a random infection, and (3) geospatial
abduction problems (see [14], [15] and references within).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. The SIR Model for Information Propagation
Consider an undirected graph G = {V, E}, where V is
the set of nodes and E is the set of (undirected) edges.
Each node v ∈ V has three possible states: susceptible (S),
infected (I), and recovered (R). We assume a time slotted
system. Nodes change their states at the beginning of each
time slot, and the state of node v in time slot t is denoted
by Xv(t). Initially, all nodes are in state S except node v∗
which is in state I and is the information source. At the
beginning of each time slot, each infected node infects each
of its susceptible neighbors with probability q, independent of
other nodes, i.e., a susceptible node is infected with probability
0,21
2 1,-1 3 2,3
4 2,-1 5 -1,-1 6 3,-1 7 3,-1
1
4
1
3 2
3
6 7
2
Figure 1. An Example of Information Propagation
1 − (1 − q)n if it has n infected neighbors. Each infected
node recovers with probability p, i.e., its state changes from I
to R with probability p. In addition, we assume a recovered
node cannot be infected again. Since whether a node gets
infected only depends on the states of its neighbors and
whether a node becomes a recovered node only depends on
its own state in the previous time slot, the infection process
can be modeled as a discrete time Markov chain X(t) where
X(t) = {Xv(t), v ∈ V} is the states of all the nodes at time
slot t. The initial state of this Markov chain is Xv(0) = S for
v 6= v∗ and Xv∗(0) = I.
B. Information Source Detection
We assume X(t) is not fully observable since we cannot
distinguish susceptible nodes and recovered ones. So at time
t, we observe Y = {Yv, v ∈ V} such that
Yv =
{
1, if v is in state I;
0, if v is in state S or R.
The information source detection problem is to identify v∗
given the graph G and Y, where t is an unknown parameter.
Figure 1 is an example of the infection process. The left
figure shows the information propagation over time. The nodes
on each dotted line are the nodes which are infected at that
time slot, and the arrows indicate where the infection comes
from (e.g., node 4 is infected by node 2).
The figure on the right is the network we observe, where
the shaded nodes are infected nodes and others are susceptible
or recovered nodes. The pair of numbers next to each node
are the corresponding infection time and recovery time. For
example, node 3 was infected at time slot 2 and recovered
at time slot 3. −1 indicates that the infection or recovery
has yet occurred. Note that these two pieces of information
are not available to us, and we include them in the figure to
illustrate the infection and recovery processes. If we observe
the network at the end of time slot 3, then the snapshot of
the network is Y = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1}, where the states are
ordered according to the indices of the nodes.
C. Maximum Likelihood Detection
We define X[0, t] = {X(τ) : 0 < τ ≤ t} to be a sample
path of the infection process from 0 to t. In addition, we define
function F (·) such that
F (Xv(t)) =
{
1, if Xv(t) = I;
0, otherwise.
We say F(X[t]) = Y if F (Xv(t)) = Yv for all v. Identifying
the information source can be formulated as a maximum
likelihood detection problem as follows:
v† ∈ arg max
v∈V
∑
X[0,t]:F(X(t))=Y
Pr(X[0, t]|v∗ = v),
where Pr(X[0, t]|v∗ = v) is the probability to obtain sample
path X[0, t] given the information source is node v.
We note the difficulty of solving this maximum likelihood
problem is the curse of dimensionality. For each v such that
Yv = 0, we need to decide its infection time and recovery
time (the node is in susceptible state if the infection time is
> t), i.e., O(t2) possible choices; for each v such that Yv =
1, we need to decide the infection time, i.e., O(t) possible
choices. Therefore, even for a fixed t, the number of possible
sample paths is at least at the order of tN , where N is the
number of nodes in the network. This curse of dimensionality
makes it computationally expensive, if not impossible, to solve
the maximum likelihood problem. To overcome this difficulty,
we propose a sample path based approach which is discussed
below.
D. Sample Path Based Detection
Instead of using the MLE, we propose to identify the sample
path X∗[0, t∗] that most likely leads to Y, i.e.,
X∗[0, t∗] = arg max
t,X[0,t]∈X (t)
Pr (X[0, t]) , (1)
where X (t) = {X[0, t]|F(X(t)) = Y}. The source node
associated with X∗[0, t∗] is then viewed as the information
source.
III. SAMPLE PATH BASED DETECTION ON TREE
NETWORKS
The optimal sample paths for general graphs are still diffi-
cult to obtain. In this section, we focus on tree networks and
derive structure properties of the optimal sample paths.
First, we introduce the definition of eccentricity in graph
theory [16]. The eccentricity e(v) of a vertex v is the maximum
distance between v and any other vertex in the graph. The Jor-
dan centers of a graph are the nodes which have the minimum
eccentricity. For example, in Figure 2, the eccentricity of node
v1 is 4 and the Jordan center is v2, whose eccentricity is 3.
Following a similar terminology, we define the infection
eccentricity e˜(v) given Y as the maximum distance between
v and any infected nodes in the graph. Define the Jordan
infection centers of a graph to be the nodes with the mini-
mum infection eccentricity given Y. In Figure 2, nodes v3,
v10, v13 and v14 are observed to be infected. The infection
eccentricities of v1, v2, v3, v4 are 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively, and
the Jordan infection center is v1.
We will show that the source associated with the optimal
sample path is a node with the minimum infection eccentricity.
We derive this result using three steps: first, assuming the
information source is vr, we analyze t∗vr such that
t∗vr = argt maxt,X[0,t]
Pr(X[0, t]|v∗ = vr),
Figure 2. An Example Illustrating the Infection Eccentricity
i.e., t∗vr is the time duration of the optimal sample path in
which vr is the information source. It turns out that t∗vr equals
to the infection eccentricity of node vr. Considering Figure
2 if the source is v1, then the time duration of the optimal
sample path starting from v1 is 2.
In the second step, we consider two neighboring nodes, say
nodes v1 and v2. We will prove that if e˜(v1) < e˜(v2), then
the optimal sample path rooted at v1 occurs with a higher
probability than the optimal sample path rooted at v2.
Finally, at the third step, we will show that given any two
nodes u and v, if v has the minimum infection eccentricity
and u has a larger infection eccentricity, then there exists
a path from u to v along which the infection eccentricity
monotonically decreases, which implies that the source of
the optimal sample path must be a Jordan infection center.
For example, in Figure 2, node v4 has a larger infection
eccentricity than v1 and v4 → v3 → v2 → v1 is the path along
which the infection eccentricity monotonically decreases from
5 to 2.
A. The Optimal Time
Lemma 1. Consider a tree network rooted at vr and with
infinitely many levels. Assume the information source is the
root, and the observed infection topology is Y which contains
at least one infected node. If e˜(vr) ≤ t1 < t2, then the
following inequality holds
max
X[0,t1]∈X (t1)
Pr(X[0, t1]) > max
X[0,t2]∈X (t2)
Pr(X[0, t2]),
where X (t) = {X[0, t]|F(X(t)) = Y}. In addition,
t∗vr = e˜(vr) = maxu∈I
d(vr, u),
where d(vr, u) is the length of the shortest path between vr
and u and also called the distance between vr and u, and I
is the set of infected nodes. 
Proof: We start from the case where the time difference
of two sample paths is one, i.e., we will show that
max
X[0,t]∈X (t)
Pr(X[0, t]) > max
X[0,t+1]∈X (t+1)
Pr(X[0, t+ 1]).
(2)
We divide all possible infection topologiesY into countable
subsets {Yk} where Yk is the set of infection topologies where
the largest distance from vr to an infected node is k. Y0 is the
topology where there is only one infected node—the root node
vr. Note that if no infected node is observed, no algorithm
performs better than a random guess. To prove (2), we use
induction over k.
Step 1: First, we consider the case k = 0. All the sample
paths considered in step 1 lead to observation Y ∈ Y0. We
denote by Tvr the tree rooted in vr and T
−vr
u the tree rooted at
u but without the branch from vr. For example, Figure 3 shows
T−vrv1 , T
−vr
v2 , T
−vr
v3 and T
−vr
v4 . The sample path from time
slot 0 to t restricted to T−vru is denoted by X([0, t], T
−vr
u ).
Furthermore, denote by C(v) the set of children of v. We have
Pr(X[0, t])
= Pr(Xvr (s) = I, 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
×
∏
u∈C(vr)
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )|Xvr (t) = I)
= (1− p)t
∏
u∈C(vr)
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )|Xvr (t) = I),
where the last equality holds since vr is the only infected
node in the network at time t, which requires Xvr (s) = I for
0 ≤ s ≤ t. Node u ∈ C(vr) has two possible states S or R.
Step 1.a u is susceptible if it was not infected within t time
slots. In each time slot, vr tries to infect u with probability q.
The probability that u is susceptible at time slot t is
(1− q)t,
which implies that
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )|Xvr (t) = I) = (1− q)t (3)
if Xu(t) = S.
Step 1.b If u is in the recovered state, we denote by tIu
and tRu its infection and recovery times, respectively. Then,
we have if Xu(t) = R,
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )|Xvr (t) = I)
= (1− q)tIu−1q(1− p)tRu−tIu−1p∏
w∈C(u)
Pr
(
X([0, t], T−uw )|tIu, tRu
)
,
where (1 − q)tIu−1q(1 − p)tRu−tIu−1p is the probability that
node u was infected at time tIu, and recovered at time t
R
u .
Since T−uw is also an infinite tree, there exists at least one
node ξ ∈ T−uw such that the node is in the susceptible state
but its parent node (say node γ) is in the recovered state. We
denote by T−uw \T−γξ the set of nodes that are on subtree T−uw
but not on subtree T−γξ . Then,
Pr
(
X([0, t], T−uw )|tIu, tRu
)
(4)
= Pr
(
X([0, t], T−uw \T−γξ )|tIu, tRu
)
(5)
× Pr
(
X([0, t], T−γξ )|tIγ , tRγ
)
(6)
= Pr
(
X([0, t], T−uw \T−γξ )|tIu, tRu
)
(1− q)tRγ −tIγ (7)
≤ (1− q), (8)
......
......
......
......
Figure 3. Example of Lemma 1
where equation (7) holds because ξ remained to be susceptible
during the time slots at which γ was in the infected state
and (8) holds because tRγ − tIγ ≥ 1. The maximum value of
Pr
(
X([0, t], T−uw )|tIu, tRu
)
can be achieved in the sample path
in which u was infected and then recovered in the next time
slot so that w was vulnerable to infection only in one time
slot. Furthermore,
(1− q)tIu−1q(1− p)tRu−tIu−1p
is maximized when tIu = 1, t
R
u = 2 i.e., u was infected at the
first time slot and recovered in the second time slot. Therefore,
if Xu(t) = R,
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )|Xvr (t) = I) ≤ qp(1− q)|C(u)|. (9)
Step 1.c Define X∗[0, t] to be the optimal solution to
max
X[0,t]∈X (t)
Pr(X[0, t]).
For t = 1, since all u ∈ C(vr) are in the susceptible state,
Pr (X∗([0, t]) = (1− p)(1− q)|C(vr)|. (10)
For t ≥ 2, according to (3) and (9),
Pr (X∗([0, t]) (11)
= (1− p)t
∏
u∈C(vr)
max
{
(1− q)t, qp(1− q)|C(u)|
}
. (12)
Note that t is fixed in this optimization problem and (12) is a
none-increasing function of t. Since |C(u)| ≥ 1,
Pr (X∗([0, 2])
≤ (1− p)2 max
{
(1− q)2|C(vr)|, (qp(1− q))|C(vr)|
}
< (1− p)(1− q)|C(vr)|
= Pr (X∗[0, 1]) .
In a summary, Pr (X∗([0, t]) is a none-increasing function of
t ∈ [1,∞) when k = 0.
Step 2: Assume (2) holds for k ≤ n, and consider k = n+1.
Clearly t ≥ n+ 1 ≥ 1 for each X[0, t] such that
F(X[0, t]) ∈ Yn+1.
Furthermore, the set of subtrees T = {T−vru |u ∈ C(vr)} are
divided into two subsets: T h = {T−vru |u ∈ C(vr),Y(T−vru )∩
I = ∅} and T i = T \T h, where Y(T−vru ) is the vector of
Y restricted to subtree T−vru . In Figure 3, T h = {T−vrv4 }
and T i = {T−vrv1 , T−vrv2 , T−vrv3 }. We note that given tRvr , the
infection processes on the sub-trees are mutually independent.
Step 2.a Recall that T h is the set of subtrees having no
infected nodes. Following the argument for the k = 0 case,
we can obtain that if T−vru ∈ T h, then
Pr(X∗([0, t], T−vru )|tRvr ) = max
{
(1− q)tRvr , qp(1− q)|C(u)|
}
when t ≥ tRvr and
Pr(X∗([0, t], T−vru )|tRvr ) = max
{
(1− q)t, qp(1− q)|C(u)|
}
when t < tRvr . So Pr(X([0, t], T
−vr
u )|tRvr ) is non-increasing in
t given any tRvr .
Step 2.b For T−vru ∈ T i, given the sample path X˜([0, t +
1], T−vru ), we will construct a sample path X([0, t], T
−vr
u )
which occurs with a higher probability. Denote the infection
time of u in sample path X([0, t], T−vru ) by t
I
u. We let t˜
I
u
denote the infection time in sample path X˜([0, t+ 1], T−vru ).
If t˜Iu > 1, we choose t
I
u = t˜
I
u − 1, i.e., u is infected one
time slot later in X˜[0, t + 1] than that in X[0, t]. Assume
the infection processes after u was infected are the same in
the two sample paths X([0, t], T−vru ) and X˜([0, t+ 1], T
−vr
u ).
Therefore, we have
Pr(X˜([0, t+1], T−vru )) = (1−q)t˜
I
u−1qPr(X˜([0, t+1], T−vru )|t˜Iu),
and
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )) = (1− q)t
I
u−1qPr(X([0, t], T−vru )|tIu).
where Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )|tIu) is the probability of
X([0, t], T−vru ) after u was infected. Since the sample
paths X([0, t], T−vru ) and X˜([0, t + 1], T
−vr
u ) are the same
after u was infected, we obtain
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru )|tIu) = Pr(X˜([0, t+ 1], T−vru )|t˜Iu).
Therefore, with tIu = t˜
I
u − 1, we get
Pr(X˜([0, t+ 1], T−vru )) < Pr(X([0, t], T
−vr
u ))
If t˜Iu = 1, we set t
I
u = t˜
I
u = 1.
1 Based on the induction
assumption, for k ≤ n since Y(T−vru ) ∈ Ym,m ≤ n, we
have
max
X([0,t],T−vru )∈X (t,T−vru )
Pr(X([0, t], T−vru ))
> max
X˜([0,t+1],T−vru )∈X (t+1,T−vru )
Pr(X˜([0, t+ 1], T−vru )),
where X (t, T−vru ) = {X([0, t], T−vru ) : F(X([0, t], T−vru )) =
Y(T−vru )}. Therefore, given any X˜([0, t + 1], T−vru ), we
can always find a corresponding sample path X([0, t], T−vru ),
which occurs with a higher probability.
Step 2.c Now we consider the sample path X∗[0, t+1] and
denote by t˜Rvr the recovery time of node vr in X
∗[0, t + 1].
We now construct a sample path X¯[0, t] as follows:
1Note that we cannot apply the same argument to t˜Iu > 1 because t
I
u = t˜
I
u
may not be feasible in a valid X[0, t].
• If t˜Rvr > t+ 1, i.e., vr is an infected node, then t¯
R
vr > t,
where t¯Rvr is the recovery time of vr in X¯[0, t].
• If t˜Rvr ≤ t, we choose t¯Rvr = t˜Rvr .
• If t˜Rvr = t+ 1, we choose t¯
R
vr = t.
We further complete X¯[0, t] by having optimal ones on T h
and constructing the ones in T i following step 2.b. According
to steps 2.a and 2.b, it is easy to verify that X¯[0, t] occurs with
a higher probability than X∗[0, t+1]. Therefore, we conclude
that inequality (2) holds for k = n + 1, hence for any k
according to the principle of induction.
Step 3 Repeatedly applying inequality (2), we obtain that
t∗vr is the minimum amount of time required to produce the
observed infection topology. The minimum time required is
equal to the maximum distance from vr to an infected node.
Therefore, the lemma holds.
B. The Sample Path Based Estimator
After deriving t∗v , we have a unique t
∗
v for each v ∈ V . The
next lemma states that the optimal sample path starting from
a node with a smaller infection eccentricity is more likely to
occur.
Lemma 2. Consider a tree network with infinitely many levels.
Assume the information source is the root, and the observed
infection topology is Y which contains at least one infected
node. For u, v ∈ V such that (u, v) ∈ E , if t∗u > t∗v, then
Pr(X∗u([0, t
∗
u])) < Pr(X
∗
v([0, t
∗
v])),
where X∗u[0, t
∗
u] is the optimal sample path starting from node
u.
Proof: Recall that Tv denotes the tree rooted at v and
T−vu denotes the tree rooted at u but without the branch
from v. Furthermore, C(v) is the set of children of v, and
X([0, t], T−vu ) is the sample path X[0, t] restricted to T
−v
u .
Step 1: The first step is to show t∗u = t∗v+1. First we claim
T−uv ∩I 6= ∅. Otherwise, all infected node are on T−vu . Since
on a tree, v can only reach nodes in T−vu through edge (u, v),
t∗v = t
∗
u + 1, which contradicts t
∗
u > t
∗
v.
If T−vu ∩ I 6= ∅, ∀a ∈ T−vu ∩ I, we have
d(u, a) = d(v, a)− 1 ≤ t∗v − 1,
and ∀b ∈ T−uv ∩ I,
d(u, b) = d(v, b) + 1 ≤ t∗v + 1.
Hence,
t∗u ≤ t∗v + 1,
which implies that
t∗v < t
∗
u ≤ t∗v + 1,
i.e., t∗u = t
∗
v + 1.
If T−vu ∩ I = ∅, all infected nodes are in T−uv , so it is
obvious t∗u = t
∗
v + 1.
Step 2: In this step, we will prove that tIv = 1 on the sample
path X∗u[0, t
∗
u]. If t
I
v > 1 on X
∗
u([0, t
∗
u]), then
t∗u − tIv = t∗v + 1− tIv < t∗v.
Note that according to the definition of t∗u and t
I
v, within t
∗
u−tIv
time slots, node v can infect all infected nodes on T−uv . Since
t∗u = t
∗
v + 1, the infected node farthest from node u must be
on T−uv , which implies that there exists a node a ∈ T−uv such
that d(u, a) = t∗u = t
∗
v+1 and d(v, a) = t
∗
v. So node v cannot
reach a within t∗u − tIv time slots, which contradicts the fact
that the infection can spread from node v to a within t∗u − tIv
time slots along the sample path X∗u[0, t
∗
u]. Therefore, t
I
v = 1.
Step 3: Now given sample path X∗u[0, t∗u], we construct
Xv[0, t
∗
v] which occurs with a higher probability. We divide
the sample path X∗u[0, t
∗
u] into two parts along subtrees T
−v
u
and T−uv . Since t
I
v = 1, we have
Pr(X∗u[0, t
∗
u])
= qPr
(
X∗u
(
[0, t∗u], T
−u
v
) ∣∣∣tIv = 1)Pr (X∗u ([0, t∗u], T−vu )) ,
where q is the probability that v is infected at the first time
slot. Suppose in Xv[0, t∗v], node u was infected at the first
time slot, then
Pr(Xv[0, t
∗
v]) =
qPr
(
Xv
(
[0, t∗v], T
−u
v
))
Pr
(
Xv
(
[0, t∗v], T
−v
u
) ∣∣∣tIu = 1) .
For the subtree T−uv , given X
∗
u ([0, t
∗
u], T
−u
v ) , in which
tIv = 1, we construct the partial sample path Xv ([0, t
∗
v], T
−u
v )
to be identical to X∗u ([0, t
∗
u], T
−u
v ) except that all events occur
one time slot earlier, i.e.,
Xv
(
[0, t∗v], T
−u
v
)
= X∗u
(
[1, t∗u], T
−u
v
)
.
This is feasible because t∗v = t
∗
u − 1. Then
Pr
(
X∗u
(
[0, t∗u], T
−u
v
) ∣∣∣tIv = 1) = Pr (Xv ([0, t∗v], T−uv )) .
For the subtree T−vu , we construct Xv([0, t
∗
v], T
−v
u ) such
that
Xv([0, t
∗
v], T
−v
u ) ∈
arg maxX˜([0,t∗v ],T
−v
u )∈X (t∗v,T−vu ) Pr
(
X˜
(
[0, t∗v], T
−v
u
) ∣∣∣tIu = 1) .
Based on Lemma 1, we have
max
X˜([0,t∗v ],T
−v
u )∈X (t∗v,T−vu )
Pr
(
X˜
(
[0, t∗v], T
−v
u
) ∣∣∣tIu = 1) =
max
X˜([0,t∗u−1],T−vu )∈X (t∗u−1,T−vu )
Pr
(
X˜
(
[0, t∗u − 1], T−vu
) ∣∣∣tIu = 1)
> max
X([0,t∗u],T
−v
u )∈X (t∗u,T−vu )
Pr
(
X
(
[0, t∗u], T
−v
u
))
.
Therefore, given the optimal sample path rooted at u, we have
constructed a sample path rooted at v which occurs with a
higher probability. The lemma holds.
Next, we give a useful property of the Jordan infection
centers in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. On a tree network with at least one infected node,
there exist at most two Jordan infection centers. When the
network has two Jordan infection centers, the two must be
neighbors. 
Proof: First, we claim if there are more than one Jordan
infection centers, they must be adjacent. Suppose v, u ∈ V are
two Jordan infection centers and e˜(v) = e˜(u) = λ. Suppose
v and u are not adjacent, i.e., d(v, u) > 1. Then, there exists
w ∈ V such that
d(w, u) = 1,
and
d(w, v) = d(v, u)− 1,
i.e., w is a neighbor of u and is on the shortest path between
u and v. Note in a tree structure w is unique.
If I ∩ T−wu = ∅, then ∀a ∈ I,
d(w, a) = d(u, a)− 1 < d(u, a),
which contradicts the fact that u is a Jordan infection center.
If I ∩ T−wu 6= ∅. Since ∀b ∈ I ∩ T−wu ,
d(v, b) = d(v, w) + d(w, b),
i.e.,
d(w, b) = d(v, b)− d(v, w) ≤ λ− 1.
On the other hand, since e˜(u) = λ, ∀h ∈ T−uw ∩ I,
d(w, h) = d(u, h)− 1 ≤ λ− 1.
In a summary, ∀h ∈ I,
d(w, h) ≤ λ− 1,
which contradicts the fact that the minimum infection eccen-
tricity is λ.
Therefore all Jordan infection centers must be adjacent to
each other. However, suppose there exist n infection eccen-
tricity centers where n > 2, they would form a clique with
n nodes which contradicts the fact that the graph is a tree.
Therefore, there exist at most two adjacent Jordan infection
centers.
Based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we finish this section
with the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Consider a tree network with infinitely many
levels. Assume that the observed infection topologyY contains
at least one infected node. Then the source node associated
with X∗[0, t∗] (the solution to the optimization problem (1))
is a Jordan infection center, i.e.,
v† = arg min
v∈V
e˜(v).
Proof: We assume the network has two Jordan infection
centers: w and u, and assume e˜(w) = e˜(u) = λ. The same
argument works for the case where the network has only one
Jordan infection center.
Based on Lemma 3, w and u must be adjacent. We will
show for any a ∈ V\{w, u}, there exists a path from a to u
(or w) along which the infection eccentricity strictly decreases.
Step 1: First, it is easy to see from Figure 4 that d(γ,w) ≤
λ − 1 ∀γ ∈ T−uw ∩ I. We next show that there exists a node
ξ such that the equality holds.
Figure 4. A Pictorial Description of the Positions of Nodes a, u, w and ξ.
Suppose that d(γ,w) ≤ λ− 2 for any γ ∈ T−uw ∩ I, which
implies
d(γ, u) ≤ λ− 1 ∀γ ∈ T−uw ∩ I.
Since w and u are both Jordan infection centers, we have
∀γ ∈ T−wu ∩ I,
d(γ,w) ≤ λ
d(γ, u) ≤ λ− 1.
In a summary, ∀γ ∈ I,
d(γ, u) ≤ λ− 1.
This contradicts the fact that e˜(w) = e˜(u) = λ. Therefore,
there exists ξ ∈ T−uw ∩ I such that
d(ξ, w) = λ− 1.
Step 2: Similarly, ∀γ ∈ T−wu ∩ I,
d(γ, u) ≤ λ− 1,
and there exists a node such that the equality holds.
Step 3: Next we consider a ∈ V\{w, u}, and assume a ∈
T−wu and d(a, u) = β. Then for any γ ∈ T−uw ∩ I, we have
d(a, γ) = d(a, u) + d(u,w) + d(w, γ)
≤ β + 1 + λ− 1
= λ+ β,
and there exists ξ ∈ T−uw ∩I such that the equality holds. On
the other hand, ∀γ ∈ T−wu ∩ I.
d(a, γ) ≤ d(a, u) + d(u, γ)
≤ β + λ− 1.
Therefore, we conclude that
e˜(a) = λ+ β,
so the infection eccentricity decreases along the path from a
to u.
Step 4: Repeatedly applying Lemma 2 along the path from
node a to u, we can conclude that the optimal sample path
rooted at node u is more likely to occur than the optimal
sample path rooted at node a. Therefore, the root node
associated with the optimal sample path X∗[0, t∗] must be
a Jordan infection center, and the theorem holds.
IV. REVERSE INFECTION ALGORITHM
Since in tree networks with infinitely many levels, the
estimator based on the sample path approach is a Jordan
infection center, we view the Jordan infection centers as
possible candidates of the information source. We next present
a simple algorithm to find the information source in general
networks. The algorithm is to first identify the Jordan infection
centers, and then break ties based on the sum of distances to
infected nodes.
The key idea of the algorithm is to let every infected
node broadcast a message containing its identity (ID) to
its neighbors. Each node, after receiving messages from its
neighbors, checks whether the ID in the message has been
received. If not, the node records the ID (say v), the time at
which the message is received (say tv), and then broadcasts
the ID to its neighbors. When a node receives the IDs of all
infected nodes, it claims itself as the information source and
the algorithm terminates. If there are multiple nodes receiving
all IDs at the same time, the tie is broken by selecting the
node with the smallest
∑
tv.
The tie-breaking rule we proposed is to choose the node
with the maximum infection closeness [17]. The closeness
measures the efficiency of a node to spread information to
all other nodes. The closeness of a node is the inverse of the
sum of distances from the node to any other nodes. In our
model, we define the infection closeness as the inverse of the
sum of distances from a node to all infected nodes, which
reflects the efficiency to spread information to infected nodes.
We select a Jordan infection center with the largest infection
closeness, breaking ties at random.
Algorithm 1 Reverse Infection Algorithm
for i ∈ I do
i sends its ID ωi to its neighbors.
end for
while t ≥ 1 and STOP== 0 do
for u ∈ V do
if u receives ωi for the first time then
Set tui = t and then broadcast the message ωi to its
neighbors.
If there exists a node who received |I| distinct
messages, then set STOP == 1.
end if
end for
end while
return u† = arg minu∈S
∑
i∈I tui, where S is the set of
nodes who receive |I| distinct messages when the algorithm
terminates. Ties are broken at random.
It is easy to verify that the set S is the set of the Jordan
infection centers. The running time of the algorithm is equal
to the minimum infection eccentricity and the number of
messages each node receives/sends during each time slot is
bounded by its degree.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The reverse infection algorithm is based on the structure
properties of the optimal sample paths on trees. While the
MLE is the node that maximizes the likelihood of the snapshot
among all possible nodes, the sample path based estimator
does not have such a guarantee. To demonstrate the effective-
ness of the sample path based approach, we next show that
on (g+ 1)-regular trees where each node has g+ 1 neighbors,
the information source generated by the reverse infection
algorithm is within a constant distance from the actual source
with a high probability, independent of the number of infected
nodes and the time at which the snapshot Y was taken.
Theorem 5. Consider a (g + 1)-regular tree with infinitely
many levels where g > 2 and gq > 1. Assume that the
observed infection topology Y contains at least one infected
node. Given  > 0, there exists d such that the distance
between the optimal sample path estimator and the actual
source is d with probability 1 − , where d is independent
of the number of infected nodes and the time the snapshot Y
was taken.
Proof: Consider the tree rooted at the information source
v∗. We say v∗ is at level 0. We denote by Zl the set of infected
and recovered nodes at level l. Furthermore, we define Zτl to
be the set of infected and recovered nodes at level l whose
parents are in set Zτl−1 and who were infected within τ time
slots after their parents were infected. We assume Zτ0 = {v∗}.
In addition, let Zl = |Zl| and Zτl = |Zτl |.
Note
lim
τ→∞Z
τ
l = Zl,
and given v and u ∈ Zτl ,
|tIv − tIu| ≤ l(τ − 1),
i.e., the infection times of nodes in Zτl differ by at most l(τ−
1) (note that the difference is not τ − 1 since the parents of u
and v may be infected at different times). Our proof is based
on the Galton Watson (GW) branching process [18]. A GW
branching process is a stochastic process B(l) which evolves
according to the recurrence formula B(0) = 1 and
B(l) =
B(l−1)∑
i=1
ζi,
where {ζi} is a set of random variables, taking values from
nonnegative integers. The distribution of ζi is called the
offspring distribution of the branching process. In a (g + 1)-
regular tree, the evolution of Zτl is a branching process, where
the offspring distribution is a function of τ. We use Bτ to
denote the corresponding branching process, and Bτ (l) to
denote the number of offsprings at level l, i.e., Bτ (l) = Zτl
(we use these two notations interchangeably). Given a node is
in the infected state for t time slots, the number of infected
offsprings follows a binomial distribution. Note the following
two facts:
...
...
... ...
...
... ...
Figure 5. A pictorial description of the positions of v′, v˜, u1, and w.
• The number of time slots at which a node is in the
infected state follows a geometric distribution with pa-
rameter p.
• A child remains to be susceptible with probability (1−q)τ
when the parent has been in the infected state for τ time
slot.
Therefore, the offspring distribution of the branching process
Bτ at level ≥ 12 is
Pr(γ = i)
=
τ−1∑
t=1
(1− p)t−1p
(
g
i
)(
1− (1− q)t)i (1− q)t(g−i)
+
(
1−
τ−1∑
t=1
(1− p)t−1p
)(
g
i
)
(1− (1− q)τ )i (1− q)τ(g−i),
where γ is the number of offsprings of a node. The offspring
distribution of branching process B∞ is
Pr(γ′ = i)
=
∞∑
t=1
(1− p)t−1p
(
g
i
)(
1− (1− q)t)i (1− q)t(g−i).
Each infected node can be viewed the source of branching
processes on the subtree rooted at the node. We define Kl
to be the number of survived B1 branching processes whose
roots are in set Zτl , where a branching process survives if it
never dies out.
Now given L ≥ 2, we consider the following events:
• Event 1: ZL = 0
• Event 2: Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L. In other words, at least
two B1 branching processes starting from Zτl survive for
some l ≤ L.
We note that these two are disjoint events.
When Zl = 0, no node at level L is infected and the
infection process terminates at level L − 1. When there is
at least one infected node in Y, since e˜(v∗) ≤ L − 1, the
minimum infection eccentricity is at most L − 1. Therefore,
the distance between v∗ and v† is no more than 2(L− 1).
2The source node has g + 1 children while other nodes have g children
Given Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L, we will argue that the
distance between the sample path based estimator and the
actual one is upper bounded by (τ +1)L−1. Consider Figure
5, where the shaded nodes are infected and recovered nodes.
We will show that if two B1 branching processes starting from
l ≤ L survive, a node at level ≥ (τ+1)L−1 cannot be a Jordan
infection center. Recall that at time t, the distance between any
infected node and the actual source is no more than t, which
implies the eccentricity of a Jordan infection center is ≤ t.
Now consider a node v˜ at level ≥ (τ + 1)l− 1. Recall that at
least two B1 branching processes starting from level l survive.
Let u1 ∈ Zτl be the root of a survived B1 branching process,
and assume node v˜ is not on the subtree rooted at u1. Further,
assume v′ is an infected node at the lowest level on sub-tree
T−wu1 . Since the branching process B
1
u1 survives, the infection
process propagates one level lower at each time slot and node
v′ is at level l + t− tIu1 .
From Figure 5, it is easy to see that the distance between
v′ and v˜ is at least
t− tIu1 + 2 + (τ + 1)l − 1− l = t− tIu1 + τ l + 1,
which occurs when the first common predecessor of nodes v′
and v˜ is at l−1 level. Note that the common predecessor cannot
appear at level ≥ l since v˜ is not on T−wu1 . Since u1 ∈ Zτl , the
infection time of node u1 is no later than τ l, i.e., tIu1 ≤ τ l.
Therefore, the distance between v′ and v˜ is at least t + 1,
which is larger than t. Hence, v′ cannot be a Jordan infection
center. Since l ≤ L, any node at or below level (τ + 1)L− 1
cannot be a Jordan infection center. In a summary, if event 2
occurs, then we have
d(v∗, v†) ≤ (τ + 1)L− 1.
We next show that given any , we can find sufficiently
large τ and L, independent of t and the number of infected
nodes, such that the probability that either event 1 or event 2
occurs is at least 1− .
Given n0 > 0 and τ > 0, we define
l† = min {l : Zτl > n0} ,
i.e., l† is the first level at which Bτ has more than n0 nodes.
We first have
Pr(ZL = 0) + Pr (Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L)
≥Pr(ZL = 0) + Pr
(
Kl† ≥ 2 and l† ≤ L
)
= Pr(ZL = 0) + Pr
(
l† ≤ L)Pr(Kl† ≥ 2∣∣∣l† ≤ L)
= Pr(ZL = 0) + Pr
(
L⋃
i=1
{Zτi > n0}
)
Pr
(
Kl† ≥ 2
∣∣∣l† ≤ L)
≥
(
1− Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
{0 < Zτi ≤ n0}
)
− Pr
(
L⋃
i=1
{Zτi = 0}
))
× Pr
(
Kl† ≥ 2
∣∣∣l† ≤ L)+ Pr(ZL = 0).
Note that we have
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† ≤ L)
=
L∑
l=1
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† = l) Pr(l† = l|l† ≤ L). (13)
According to Lemma 6, given any 1 > 0, we can find a
sufficiently large n0 such that
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† = l) ≥ (1− 1),
which implies that for sufficiently large n0,
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† ≤ L) ≥ 1− 1.
We can then conclude
Pr(ZL = 0) + Pr (Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L)
≥
(
1− Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
{0 < Zτi ≤ n0}
))
(1− 1)
− Pr
(
L⋃
i=1
{Zτi = 0}
)
+ Pr(ZL = 0)
=
(
1− Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
{0 < Zτi ≤ n0}
))
(1− 1)
+ Pr(ZL = 0)− Pr(ZτL = 0),
where Pr(∪Li=1 {Zτi = 0}) = Pr(ZτL = 0) because Zτl = 0
implies that ZτL = 0 for l ≤ L.
According to Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, given any 2 > 0
and 3 > 0, there exist sufficiently large τ and L such that(
1− Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
{0 < Zτi ≤ n0}
))
> 1− 2,
and
Pr(ZL = 0)− Pr(ZτL = 0) ≥ −3.
Hence, we have
Pr(ZL = 0) + Pr (Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L)
≥ (1− 1)(1− 2)− 3.
Now choosing 1 = 2 = 3 = 4/3 for some 4 > 0, we have
Pr(ZL = 0) + Pr (Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L)
≥ 1− 4.
Now let |Y| denote the number of infected nodes in the
observation Y. Define events E1 = {ZL = 0} and E2 =
{Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L}. We have
Pr(E1||Y| = 1) + Pr (E2||Y| = 1)
=
1
Pr(|Y| = 1) (Pr(E1 ∩ {|Y| = 1}) + Pr (E2 ∩ {|Y| = 1})) .
Since E2 implies that |Y| = 1, we have
Pr(E1||Y| = 1) + Pr (E2||Y| = 1)
=
1
Pr(|Y| = 1) (Pr(E1 ∩ {|Y| = 1}) + Pr (E2))
=
1
Pr(|Y| = 1) (Pr(E1)− Pr(E1 ∩ {|Y| = 0}) + Pr (E2))
≥ 1
Pr(|Y| = 1) (Pr(E1)− Pr({|Y| = 0}) + Pr (E2))
≥ 1
Pr(|Y| = 1) (Pr({|Y| = 1})− 4)
=1− 4
Pr(|Y| = 1) .
Note that Pr(|Y| = 1) is a positive constant since the
B1 branching process starting from the information source
survives with non-zero probability. The theorem holds by
choosing 4 = Pr(|Y| = 1).
Lemma 6. Consider n0 i.i.d GW branching processes with a
binomial offspring distribution with parameters g and q such
that gq > 1. Denote by K the number of branching processes
that survive. Given any  > 0, if
n0 ≥
8 log 1
1− ρ ,
then
Pr(K ≥ 2) ≥ 1− ,
where ρ is the extinction probability of the GW branching
process. In the binomial case, ρ is the smallest non-negative
root of equation ρ = (1− q + qρ)g. 
Proof: The extinction probability of a GW branching
process is denoted by ρ, which is the smallest none negative
root of equation ρ = G(ρ) according to [18], where G(ρ) is
the moment generating function of offspring distribution. In
the binomial case we have G(ρ) = (1− q+ qρ)g. ρ < 1 when
gq > 1.
We define a Bernoulli random variable Hi, for the ith
branching process such that
Hi =
{
1, if the ith branching process survives;
0, otherwise.
So K =
∑n0
i=1Hi, and
E[K] = n0(1− ρ).
According to the Chernoff bound [19], we have
Pr(K ≤ (1− δ)(1− ρ)n0) < e−
(1−ρ)n0δ2
2 .
Choose δ = 0.5. The Lemma holds if
(1− ρ)n0/2 ≥ 2,
and
(1− ρ)n0/8 ≥ log 1/.
Lemma 7. Given any  > 0, there exists a constant L′ such
that for any L ≥ L′,
Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
{0 < Zτi ≤ n0}
)
≤ .

Proof: Define pτ to be the probability that a node infects
at least one of its children if it is in the infection state for τ
time slots. We have
pτ =
τ−1∑
t=1
(1− p)t−1p(1− (1− q)gt)
+ (1− p)τ−1(1− (1− q)gτ ),
and
Pr(0 < Zτl ≤ n0|0 < Zτl−1 ≤ n0)
≤Pr(Zτl > 0|0 < Zτl−1 ≤ n0)
≤1− (1− pτ )n0 ,
which implies that
Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
0 < Zτi ≤ n0
)
= Pr(0 < ZτL ≤ n0|0 < ZτL−1 ≤ n0)
× Pr(0 < ZτL−1 ≤ n0|0 < ZτL−2 ≤ n0) · · ·
× Pr(0 < Zτ2 ≤ n0|0 < Zτ1 ≤ n0) Pr(0 < Zτ1 ≤ n0)
≤(1− (1− pτ )n0)L.
The lemma holds by choosing
L′ =
⌈
log 
log (1− (1− pτ )n0)
⌉
.
Lemma 8. Given any , there exist τ ′ and L′ such that for
any τ > τ ′ and L > L′
Pr(ZL = 0)− Pr(ZτL = 0) ≥ −.

Proof: Note the difference can be re-written as
Pr(ZL = 0)− Pr(ZτL = 0)
= (Pr(ZL=0)− Pr(Z∞=0))+(Pr(Zτ∞=0)−Pr(ZτL=0))
+ (Pr(Z∞ = 0)− Pr(Zτ∞ = 0)) .
Step 1 Since {ZτL = 0} ⊆ {Zτ∞ = 0},
Pr(Zτ∞ = 0)− Pr(ZτL = 0) ≥ 0.
Step 2 We know
lim
L→∞
Pr(ZL = 0) = Pr(Z∞ = 0).
Then for /2 > 0, there exists L′ such that for any L ≥ L′,
|Pr(ZL = 0)− Pr(Z∞ = 0)| ≤ /2,
which implies that
Pr(ZL = 0)− Pr(Z∞ = 0) ≥ −/2.
Step 3 In this step, we will show
lim
τ→∞Pr(Z
τ
∞ = 0) = Pr(Z∞ = 0).
Define the generating functions of the offspring distributions of
Bτ and B∞ to be Gτ (s) and G(s), respectively. We know that
Gτ (s)− s and G(s)− s are convex functions when s ∈ [0, 1].
Let ρ = Pr(Z∞ = 0), i.e., the extinction probability, we know
that ρ is the smallest nonnegative root of G(ρ) = ρ and ρ < 1.
Similarly, define ρτ = Pr(Zτ∞ = 0), and ρ
′ = limτ→∞ ρτ .
Taking limit on both sides of Gτ (ρτ ) = ρτ , we have
G(ρ′) = ρ′.
Note that
ρ ≤ ρτ ≤ ρ1 < 1
for any τ, so
ρ ≤ ρ′ ≤ ρ1 < 1.
Since G(s) − s = 0 has at most two solutions in [0, 1] and
s = 1 is one of them, we conclude ρ′ = ρ. Therefore, for
given /2 > 0, there exists τ ≥ τ ′ such that
Pr(Z∞ = 0)− Pr(Zτ∞ = 0) ≥ −/2.
Hence, the lemma holds.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the reverse
infection algorithm on different networks, including different
tree networks and some real world networks.
A. Tree Networks
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the reverse
infection algorithm on tree networks. We compare the reverse
infection algorithm with the closeness centrality heuristic,
which selects the node with the maximum infection close-
ness as the information source. Note that the node with the
maximum closeness is the maximum likelihood estimator of
the information source on regular trees under the SI model
[3]–[5].
1) Small-size tree networks: We first studied the perfor-
mance on small-size trees. The infection probability q was
chosen uniformly from (0, 1) and the recovery probability
p was chosen uniformly from (0, q). The infection process
propagates t time slots where t was uniformly chosen from
[3, 5]. To keep the size of infection topology small, we
restricted the total number of infected and recovered nodes to
be no more than 100. For small-size trees, we first calculated
the MLE using dynamic programming for fixed t and then
searching over t ∈ [0, tmax] for a large value of tmax to find
the optimal estimator.
The detection rate is defined to be the fraction of experi-
ments in which the estimator coincides with the actual source.
We varied g from 2 to 10 and the results are shown in Figure
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Figure 6. The Detection Rates of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE),
Reverse Infection (RI) and Closeness Centrality (CC) on Regular Trees
6. We can see that the detection rate of the reverse infection
algorithm is almost the same as that of the MLE, and is higher
than that of the closeness centrality heuristic by approximately
20% when the degree is small and by 10% when the degree
is large.
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Figure 7. The Detection Rates of the Reverse Infection (RI) and Closeness
Centrality (CC) Algorithms on Regular Trees
2) General g-regular tree networks: We further conducted
our simulations on large-size g-regular trees. The infection
probability q was chosen uniformly from (0, 1) and the
recovery probability p was chosen uniformly from (0, q).
The infection process propagates t time slots where t was
uniformly chosen from [3, 20]. We selected the networks in
which the total number of infected and recovered nodes is no
more than 500.
We varied g from 2 to 10. Figure 7 shows the detection rate
as a function of g. We can see the detection rates of both the
reverse infection and closeness centrality algorithms increase
as the degree increases and is higher than 60% when g > 6.
However, he detection rate of the reverse infection algorithm
is higher than that of the closeness centrality algorithm, and
the average difference is 8.86%.
3) Binomial random trees: In addition, we evaluated the
performance on binomial random trees where the number of
children of each node follows a binomial distribution with
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Figure 8. The Detection Rates of the Reverse Infection (RI) and Closeness
Centrality (CC) Algorithms on Binomial Random Trees
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Figure 9. The Performance of the Reverse Infection (RI) on the Internet
Autonomous Systems Network
number of trials g′ and success probability β. We fixed g′ = 10
and varied β from 0.1 to 0.9. The durations of the infection
process and the observed infected networks were selected
according to the same rules for the g-regular tree case. The
results are shown in Figure 8. Similar to the regular tree case,
as β increases, the tree is more denser which increases the
number of survived branching processes and the detection
rate. The reverse infection algorithm outperforms the closeness
centrality algorithm by 10.16% on average.
B. Real World Networks
We next conducted experiments on three real world net-
works — the Internet Autonomous Systems network (IAS)3,
the Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network (Wikipeida)4, and
the power grid network (PG)4. We compare the reverse infec-
tion algorithm with random guessing, which randomly selects
a node and declares it as the information source. In these net-
works, the infection probability q was chosen uniformly from
(0, 0.05) and the recovery probability p was chosen uniformly
from (0, q). Here we chose small infection probabilities since
the network was of finite size so the infection process should
be controlled to make sure that not all nodes were infected
when the network was observed. The duration t was an integer
uniformly chosen from [3, 200]. We selected the networks in
3Available at http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
4Available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼mejn/netdata/
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Figure 10. The Performance of the Reverse Infection (RI) on the Wikipedia
Who-Votes-on-Whom Network
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Figure 11. The Performance of the Reverse Infection (RI) on the Power
Grid Network
which the total number of infected and recovered nodes was
in the range of [50, 500].
1) The Internet autonomous systems network: Figure 9
shows the results on the the Internet autonomous systems
network. An Internet autonomous system is a collection of
connected routers who use a common routing policy. The
Internet autonomous system network is obtained based on
the recorded communication between the Internet autonomous
systems inferred from Oregon route-views on March, 31st,
2001. The network consists of 10,670 nodes and 22,002 edges.
According to Figure 9, more than 80% of the estimators
identified by the reverse infection algorithm are no more than
two hops away from the actual sources, comparing to 10%
under the random guessing.
2) The Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network: Figure 10
shows results on the Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network,
in which two nodes are connected if one user voted on the
other in the administrator promotion elections. The network
has 100,736 links and 7,066 nodes. We have similar obser-
vations as for the Internet autonomous systems network: the
majority of the estimators produced by the reverse infection
algorithm are no more than two hops away from the actual
sources; and only less than 20% of the estimators of random
guessing are within two hops from the actual sources.
3) The power grid network: Figure 11 shows the results
on the power grid, which has 4,941 nodes and 6,594 edges.
As we can see, the reverse infection algorithm performs better
than the random guessing. The peak of the reverse infection
algorithm appears at the third hop versus the seventeenth hop
under random guessing.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a sample path based approach to
find the information source under the SIR model. We proved
that the sample path based estimator is a node with the mini-
mum infection eccentricity. Based on that, a reverse infection
algorithm has been proposed. We analyzed the performance of
the reverse infection algorithm on regular trees, and showed
that with a high probability the distance between the estimator
and actual source is a constant, independent of the number of
infected nodes and the time the network was observed. We
evaluated the performance of the proposed reverse infection
algorithm on several different network topologies.
APPENDIX A
NOTATION TABLE
q the probability an infected node infects its
neighbors
p the probability an infected node recovers
v∗ the actual information source
v† the estimator of the information source
d(v, u) the length of shortest path between node v
and node u
C(v) the set of children of node v
e˜(v) the infection eccentricity of node v
t∗v the time duration associated of the optimal
sample path in which node v is the infor-
mation source
tIv the infection time of node v
tRv the recovery time of node v
Y the snapshot of all nodes
T−vu the tree rooted at node u but without the
branch from v.
Xv(t) the state of node v at time t
X(t) the states of all nodes at time t
X[0, t] the sample path from 0 to t
X([0, t], T−vu ) the sample path from time slot 0 to t
restricted to T−vu
X (t) the set of all valid sample path from time
slot 0 to t
X (t, T−vu ) the set of all valid sample path from time
slot 0 to t restricted to T−vu
I the set of the infected nodes
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